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Driven by the global warming, loss in green land, thermal expansion, and increase
in the greenhouse gases emission, two directions have been developed to overcome
these problems. Firstly, incorporating renewable energy sources (RES) such as
wind power into the current power grid, and secondly, finding the most proper
alternatives to the current grid components which aim to reduce these effects, such
as replacing the conventional transportation sector by Electric Vehicles (EVs).
With the increase of the market share of both wind power and EVs, the need for
a suitable frameworks from both economical and operational views has become
crucial. In this thesis, we aim to study and design such required frameworks for
wind power generation companies combined with the aggregator of EVs.
One of the challenges facing the wind generation companies, such as the EVs
xvi
aggregators, is the uncertainty about the available power and the energy prices.
Clearly, this variability will affect the bids of the aggregators into the energy
market. Despite the expanded dependence on centralized scheme for scheduling
of the EV charging, the burden of computational load can grow dramatically high
as the number of involved vehicles increases. In the first part of this thesis, a
decentralized game theoretic approach for scheduling the EVs charging to balance
the wind generation with the load is proposed. Analytically, Nash Equilibrium
is proven to exist and to be unique. Moreover, a closed form solution is found.
Extensive simulations for a case study of the Saudi Arabian EVs owners’ behavior
are conducted to validate the proposed model.
In the second part of this thesis, a market framework for virtual power plant
operator (VPPO) which acts as EVs aggregator and owns wind and thermal gen-
erators is addressed. The aggregator aims to maximize his profit which he gains
from bidding energy amounts in the day-ahead (DA) market. The optimal bid-
ding strategy combined with controlling the Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) assets under
the uncertainty of the wind output, energy prices, imbalance prices, and demand
is addressed. The uncertainties were modeled using robust optimization (RO)
under the worst case scenario of the uncertain parameters. A case study and
simulations are carried out to reflect the effectiveness of the proposed model. The
robust model is compared to the deterministic model, the results show that the






  احمد محمد محمود عبد المعطي االسم الكامل:
 
 ية الذكيةائية في الشبكات الكهربائاالدماج الثنائي لطاقة الرياح والسيارات الكهرب عنوان الرسالة:
 
  ية ائالهندسة الكهرب التخصص:
 
 2017 مايو تاريخ الدرجة العلمية:
في المساحات الخضراء ، التمدد الحراري ، والزيادة في انطالقا من ظاهرة االحتباس الحراري ، النقص 
انبعاث الغاازات المسببة لالحتباس الحراري، تم تطوير اتجاهين بحثيين للتغلب على هذه المشاكل. األول، هو العمل 
ائل د بداعلى زيادة دمج مصادر الطاقة المتجددة مثل طاقة الرياح في شبكات الطاقة الحالية. الثاني ، يعتمد على ايج
ة الحالية والتي تساعد في الخفض من تأثير هذه المشاكل مثل استبدال قطاع النقل بائيمناسبة لمكونات الشبكة الكهر
جنب في  ية جنبا إلىائلزيادة المتسارعة في ادماج طاقة الرياح والسيارات الكهربنظرا لية. ائالحالي بالسيارات الكهرب
الحاجة الى األطر المناسبة والتي تحاكي وجهات النظر الفنية والسوفية تعد ذات أهمية ية الحالية فإن ائالشبكة الكهرب
قصوى. في هذه األطروحة، نهدف إلى دارسة وتصميم األطر الالزمة لشركات انتاج طاقة الرياح جنبا إلى جنب مع 
 ية. ائمجمعي السيارات الكهرب
جي من أكثر التحديات التي تواجه منتواحدا سعار الكهرباء الطاقة المتاحة وأيضا أكمية من  يقينيعتبر عدم ال 
ية.  بال شك ،إن التغير في هذين العاملين سوف يؤثر على العروض ائطاقة الرياح بالمثل مجمعي السيارات الكهرب
لى التحكم عبالرغم من االعتماد المتزايد ية. ائالتي يتقدم بها منتجو الطاقة ومجمعو السيارات في اسواق الطاقة الكهرب
ية، فإن مشكلة زيادة العمليات الحسابية المطلوبة تتناسب طرديا ائالمركزي في جدولة عملية شحن السيارات الكهرب
 ية الموجودة. في الجزء األول من هذه األطروحة، قمنا باقتراح نظام تحكم المركزيائمع زيادة عدد السيارات الكهرب
ية لضمان عملية الموازنة بين االنتاج الوارد من الرياح مع ائيارات الكهربلمجمعي الس نظام لعبة نظرييعتمد على 
الحمل. تم اثبات وجود حالة االتزان )اتزان ناش(  وكذلك كونه منفردا رياضيا. عالوة إلى ذلك، تم ايجاد حل نهائي 




 ية صغيرة والذي يفترض أنهائفي الجزء الثاني من هذه األطروحة، قمنا باقتراح نموذج لمشغل شبكة كهرب
 ت إلىرامولدات حرارية. يهدف مجمع السيا ية باالضافة إلى وجود مولدات طاقة رياح وكذلكائمجمع سيارات كهرب
يقة ية اليومي.  تم عرض طرائية المنتجة في سوق الطاقة الكهربائلطاقة الكهربتعظيم الربح العائد من عرض بيع ا
لطاقة المنتجة من ا يقينية في وجود عدم الائلشبكة االنتاج مع التحكم في عملية شحن السيارات الكهرب فضلالمزايدة األ
يئة عن طريق الته يقينباقتراح نمذجة عدم المن مولدات الرياح، أسعار الطاقة ، أسعار التقويم، وكذلك األحمال. قمنا 
منها. تم عمل دراسة حالة ونظام محاكاة الثبات فعالية  يقنبافتراض اسوأ الحاالت حدوثا للعوامل غير المت المتينة
يئة ه، أظهرت النتائج ان نظام الت النموذج المقترح. تم مقارنة النموذج المقترج بنظام التهيئة المتينة مع النظام المحدد
قد حقق أرباحا لمجمع السيارات  متيقن منهاالمتينة والذي يأخذ في اعتباره أسوأ الحاالت حدوثا للمعامالت غير ال




The installed capacity of renewable energy sources (RES) is expanding quickly all
around the globe due to the arising complaints about the greenhouse gas effects
and the incremental rise in fossil fuel prices. The world wind energy associa-
tion (WWEA) [2], declared that the current total installed wind capacity reached
393 GW. The global wind power installed can now supply 4% of the worldwide
electricity demand. The wind energy is expected to represent 35% of the U.S.
electricity by 2050 according to [1] as shown in Figure 1.1. At the same time,
while working on the generation side the work continues on the demand side. The
transportation sector is one of the most energy demanding sectors and the one
most dependent on fossil fuels. More than one-quarter of the energy consumption
in the U.S. is used for transportation [3]. As a result, this sector encountering a
rush of electrification to achieve the energy security and environmental sustain-
1
Figure 1.1: Wind Vision Study Scenario relative to BAU (Business As Usual) for
USA [1].
ability. Transforming from conventional to electric vehicles (EVs) is expected to
greatly enhance the energy efficiency of transportation and reduce the emission
impact per vehicle tremendously.
However, integrating the RES into the power grid is companioned with extra
burdens. As a result, solutions have been proposed, such as provision of Vehicle-
to-grid (V2G) services. The concept of V2G is based on the fact that the EVs
can be used as energy storage unit which can help the grid and can benefit both
grid and EV owner, not just a load. These services can boost the adoption rate




The electric power industry has moved from a regulated operational structure con-
trolled by a single entity, usually the government, to a competitive one in many
countries. Recently, the electricity industry has experienced numerous reformu-
lation activities, including increasing the number of market participants and the
establishment of market operators, and aggregators. As an example in the U.S.
about two-thirds of the total load is operated in the electricity markets.
Based on the type of production to be traded, the electricity markets can be
categorized into the energy market, ancillary services market, balancing market
 Energy market
Energy is bought and sold in the energy market through a two-settlement
process: day-ahead market and real-time market (also known as the balanc-
ing market. The day-ahead market clears energy transactions each hour of
the next operating day while real-time market transactions are performed
just minutes before actual power deliveries. Energy is bought and sold in
the real-time market at real-time spot prices to make up imbalances when
system conditions change from the day-ahead market. In some European
countries, the energy market also includes an adjustment market which is
similar to the day-ahead market but is cleared closer to power delivery.
 Balancing market
The balancing market is when the traders have corresponded to the actual
power flows. It may happen that there a certain amount of the power which
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is sold in the day-ahead market but may not be exactly delivered in the real-
time. Tow types of imbalances can be faced by the generation companies.
The positive imbalance occurs when the actual power is greater than the
scheduled and the negative imbalance occurs when the actual power is lower
than the scheduled power. All the involved parties are required to submit
their schedules to the ISO which reflects their generation or consumption.
The schedules can be modified before the real time by a certain time i.e.,
1-2 hours in some markets.
 Ancillary services market
In addition to the energy market, the ancillary services market ensures the
reliability of the power system. Various types of ancillary services exist
in the market today, such as regulation, contingency, and reserves. Other
ancillary services, such as voltage control and black start services, do not
typically have auction-based markets.
The participants in an energy market can be seen as a hierarchical tree with three
nodes:
 Producers
The generation companies who supply energy or services. Their goal is to
maximize their total profits by submitting offers in the electricity market.
 Retailers (Aggregators)
They usually purchase energy or services from the energy market and sell
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them back to the consumers who do not participate directly in the energy
market due to their small capacities, i.e., EVs’ owners.
 Consumers
They are end-users who buy energy or services from the electricity market
through the retailer or the aggregator. A consumer, e.g., EV owner can
submit consumption bids to the aggregator with the goal of minimizing the
cost of purchasing energy or services.
With the consequent increasing in the number of the participants in the energy
market, there was a need for rules and regulations to control the selling and
purchasing process, and to guarantee the secure transaction. Independent System
Operator (ISO) is a neutral entity who takes these responsibilities. ISO usually
used to control the transmission tariffs, coordinate the planning and maintenance
schedules, play a vital role in forecasting the energy prices and demand, running
the market clearing operation.
1.1.2 Wind Power
Today, around 23% of the wind power capacity in the U.S. is sold either through
short-term contracts or directly into the electricity market. This percentage is
expected to increase further according to [3]. To wind power producers, the uncer-
tain characteristics of wind resources are a major obstacle to their participation
in the electricity market. Compared with conventional power producers, wind
power producers have negligible fuel costs and are exposed to high risks in the
5
electricity market. The uncertainty coming from wind power production, coupled
with the stochastic nature of market prices, results in uncertain profits for wind
power producers.
1.1.3 Electric Vehicles and V2G Overview
The concept of Vehicle-to-grid was first introduced in [4]. On the contrary of what
was previously assumed in [5], the authors in [4] suggested that the EVs are not
just a load. They assumed that the EVs can be treated as energy storage units
as well which can help in supporting the electrical grid and will be beneficial for
the grid and EV owners. This concept was expanded further in [6]. Two charging
approaches were suggested for this concept in [7]. The first one was unidirectional
V2G, or load-only V2G, where EVs were treated as a controlled load which gives
the grid operators more flexibility in charging EVs during peak hours by postpon-
ing the charging process to other times where loads are low. This type is called
V1G in some papers [8]. The second one was bidirectional V2G, or regular V2G,
which allows EVs to charge and discharge their batteries and supply the grid with
power. Since U.S. Department of Transportations statistics showed that an av-
erage vehicle spends 75% of its time parked at home, both V2G types are done
while the car is parked, which is both logical and doable .
The concept of V2G has a great potential in electricity markets for providing
different services [9], [10]. In [9], the usage of EV fleet that uses V2G concept to
provide regulation services was economically evaluated. Other studies suggested
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that V2G can be used for other services like demand side management (DSM)
and providing base energy [11],[12].
Regulation service provided by V2G is considered as the most promising service
that can be introduced to the electricity market [13] ,[14]. It is expected that uni-
directional V2G will be implemented first due to practical reasons, like the ability
of all already existing EVs to participate and provide ancillary services without
any additional hardware, the customers’ concerns about discharging their batter-
ies, and effect of discharging on the batteries life time [15]. However, unidirectional
V2G has many limitations; it has less capability of providing regulation and spin-
ning reserve services. Also, the participation time is reduced if the battery is fully
or almost fully charged. These factors affect the amount of profits that can be
made by unidirectional V2G . Using bidirectional V2G can help the grid consid-
erably during peak hours.
A single EV undoubtedly can not participate in wholesale energy markets since
it does not have enough capacity to do so. The concept of aggregators was first
introduced in [12]. The aggregator is an intermediary between the EV owners and
the independent system operator (ISO). The aggregator can help the EV owners
to participate efficiently in the electricity market and, in the same time, help the
ISO in supporting the grid. The need for the aggregator stems from the fact that
the capacity of any individual EV is too small to affect the grid. Also, this small
capacity is not suitable for bidding in most electricity markets [16]. Aggrega-
tion also decreases the forecasting uncertainty of the available power in each hour
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[17]. The aggregator gives more flexibility for EV owners who participate in the
electricity market because some owners may have some circumstances that force
them to leave during their commitment towards the market. Other possible ben-
efits of aggregators for both EV owners and electric grid are discussed thoroughly
in [16],[18].
1.2 Thesis Objectives
Based on the aforementioned discussions, this thesis presents respective studies
around EV charging and wind power into the smart grid framework, each with a
different focus.
Contribution 1, applies game theory to solve the charging scheduling problem in a
distributed fashion. The centralized solution can be considered the optimal choice
for a small number of EVs; however, the main drawback is the computational lim-
itations when the number of vehicles becomes large. Decentralized methods offer
an alternative way to solve the scheduling task by reformulating the problem into
smaller subproblems. However,the convergence of the decentralized methods to
a unique solution must be guaranteed. In this study, a game-theoretic approach
is applied to balance the generation/demand of a virtual power plant with in-
termittent power unit, i.e., wind power. Scheduling the charging of the EVs is
formulated as a game, each EV acts as a player. The equilibrium which ensure
the convergence of the solution is proved.
Contribution 2, a market framework for virtual power plant operator (VPPO),
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which acts as EVs aggregator, and owns wind and thermal generators was pro-
posed. The aggregator aims to maximize its profit which he gains from bidding
energy amounts in the day-ahead (DA) market. The optimal bidding strategy
combined with controlling the V2G assets under the uncertainty of the wind out-
put, energy prices, imbalance prices, and demand. On the contrary of the recent
models, the uncertainties is modeled using the robust optimization (RO) where
the decision maker takes his decision under the worst case scenario of the uncertain
parameters. A case study and simulation is conducted to reflect the effectiveness
of the proposed model. The robust model is compared to the deterministic model,
the results show that the robust model under uncertainties give profits which is
relatively close to the deterministic model.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of relevant research work which is pro-
vided on the wind power trading problems in the electricity market and the ag-
gregation of the EVs’ energy and the impact of the combined trading of both in
the market.
In Chapter 3, a new model for solving the charging scheduling problem in a dis-
tributed fashion is introduced. Decentralized methods offer an alternative way to
solve the scheduling task by reformulating the problem into smaller subproblems.
However, the convergence of the decentralized methods to a unique solution must
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guaranteed. Moreover, Exploiting the charging process to provide another services
to the grid is a benefit. In this study, a game theoretic approach is applied to
balance the generation-demand of a virtual power planet with intermittent power
unit i.e., wind power. Scheduling the charging of the EVs is formulated as a game
where each EV acts as a player. The equilibrium which ensure the convergence
of the solution is proofed. Furthermore, a closed form solution for the Nash equi-
librium (NE) of the game was analytically obtained. Simulation over real data is
done to verify the proposed model and it’s closed form. The simulation results
show that the proposed framework is effective in balancing the wind generation
with the connected load and beneficial for both the virtual power plant operator
and the EVs’ owners.
In Chapter 4, a market framework for virtual power plant operator (VPPO),
which acts as EVs aggregator, and owns wind and thermal generators was pro-
posed. The aggregator aims to maximize his profit which gains from bidding
energy amounts in the DA market. The optimal bidding strategy combined with
controlling the V2G assets under the uncertainty of the wind output, energy prices,
imbalance prices, and demand was proposed. On the contrary of the existing mod-
els, the uncertainties were modeled using the robust optimization (RO) where the
decision maker takes its decision under the worst case scenario of the uncertain
parameters. A case study and simulation is conducted to reflect the effectiveness
of the proposed model. The robust model is compared to the deterministic model,
the results show that the robust model under uncertainties give profits which is
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relatively close to the deterministic model.
Finally, in Chapter 5, the main conclusions of the thesis and some possible




In this chapter, we introduce a detailed literature review of relevant research work
which is provided on the wind power trading problems in the electricity market
and the aggregation of the EVs’ energy and the impact of the combined trading
of both in the market.
2.1 Game Theory - An overview
Game Theory (GT) is defined as the art of study and analysis of conflict or
cooperation [19]. It provides the theoretical framework for optimization-based
distributed control algorithms. The three main components of the game theory
are:
 Players: the decision makers, where each one wants to maximize a certain
objective by taking the best available action.
 Strategies: the set of actions that the player may take to achieve its ob-
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jective.
 Payoffs: the benefits that the player gains after each player plays its action.
Concerning the relation with the time, the games are classified as static and
dynamic. In static games all the players take their decisions simultaneously, and
the time has no effect on their payoffs. On the other hand, dynamic games where
one player has all the information about the actions of the others, he can play
more than one time, that the time is playing the main role in the process of
decision-making. From another point of view, the games can be categorized into
non-cooperative games, where there is no communication between the players and
each player acts to maximize his own utility, and cooperative games where the
players communicate with each other and plan for maximizing the overall benefit.
The solution of the game is known as Nash Equilibrium (NE) and defined as the
state where none of the players would have an incentive to deviate unilaterally
[20], [21] , [22].
In Section (2.2) we are going to explore the employment of game theory in different
smart grids folds.
2.2 Game-theoretic Models into Smart Grids
2.2.1 Demand Side Management with Game Theory
The reliability of the power grids is very crucial. In smart grids, the penetration of
renewable energy resources, the evolution of modern control, may decrease the re-
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liability of the system. The demand side management (DSM) plays an important
role to solve this problem. The primary role of DSM is to match the generation
of the utility to the demand of the customers. Therefore, the objectives of many
of the research problems is to minimize the cost of generation, achieve proper
PAR, and maximize social welfare. DSM is classified into price-based (smart
pricing) and incentive-based (i.e. direct load control (DLC)) techniques. The
former one relies on designing pricing policies for the customers to provide the
incentives to change their consumption by reduction or shifting using energy con-
sumption schedules (ECS). Many pricing techniques are used such as teal-time
pricing (RTP), time of use (TOU), and day-ahead pricing (DAP) [23], [24], [25],
[26].
Bu et al. [23] argue that many of the researchers in DSM rely on the assump-
tion that the price of energy and the arrival distribution of demand is already
known before, which is not actually practical. So they introduce a stochastic
model to control the loads. The authors modelled their algorithm in two stages.
At the first stage, Markov decision process was used to formulate the real-time
load scheduling, then a learning algorithm was used in the second stage to reduce
the amount of needed information for the making decision process. The algorithm
reveals a remarkable performance with 30% better than the other learning algo-
rithms exists in the literature.
Li et al. [25] proposed a game model between the retailer and the users as a
four stages Stackelberg game. At the first stage the retailer playing as a leader
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decides on the source of energy to be used, at the second stage the retailer decides
on the amount of energy needed, and the price of energy is decided at the third
stage. The users, who play as followers, decide on their energy needs to maximize
their payoffs at the last stage of the game. The equilibrium of the game is ob-
tained using backward induction to verify the direct benefits for both parties of
the game.
Mondal et al. [27] proposed an auction game. The authors merged the mini-
mization of generation cost and the maximization of social welfare into one func-
tion, which was solved in two stages. In the first phase, convex optimization model
was used to find the minimum generation cost. In the second phase, the gener-
ated optimal load was used with Vickrey auction to solve the maximum social
welfare. As the untruthful bidding is a common problem with the auction games,
the authors introduced the reserve price and studied the Bayesian Nash equilibria
to overcome the collusive actions by the customers.
2.2.2 Micro-grids with Game Theory
Micro-grids can be defined as a group of distributed energy sources that located to
serve a small geographical areas. Micro-grids may work in isolated mode (island
mode), or connected to other MGs or connected to the macro-grid.
Saad et al. [28] introduced the micro-grid (MG) concept that was connected to
other distributed energy resources, such as solar panels and wind turbines. They
modelled the network as a coalition game with the coalition consisting of a number
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N of MGs. The players can cooperate with each other to sell or buy energy inside
the coalition while the one that will sell energy outside the coalition firstly will
be excluded. The game was constrained by the capacity of each network and
the power losses in distributed power lines. The authors concluded the paper by
introducing the collaborative model that yields a significant reduction in terms of
power loss over the non-cooperative model.
2.2.3 Overview of Electric Vehicle into Smart Grids
Due to the high intermittency of renewable energy sources (RES’s), the EVs is a
promising solution for the imbalance problem in the smart grid system. In peak
hours, the generation of the grid is not enough to meet the demand of the users.
In off-peak hours the grid has excess power since the demand (load) is less than
the generation. The balancing between the generation and the load is very crucial
for the smart grid. EVs can provide this service by the meaning of V2G.
Han et al. [9], the authors discussed the problem of EVs that plugged in
with high SOC, they can’t discharge till the regulation up signal is provided by
the utility; consequently, the profit of the aggregator will be decreased. Uneven
distribution of the regulation capacity between the EVs will guarantee to maximize
the profit of the aggregator with providing the requested regulation signal. The
problem modelled as a Quadratic program under energy constraints. The authors
did not consider the unexpected departure of the EV.
Lam et al. [29] , [30] discussed the problem of estimation the capacity of the
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aggregator. The authors modelled the regulation up capacity and regulation down
capacity separately. Using Queuing theory the EV’s was arranged according to
their state of charge. Then the capacity normalized to the number of EV’s in each
queue. Smart charging mechanism was designed in the extended version.
Lee et al. [31] proposed a model of charging station which is authorized to
provide the regulation service for individual vehicles in a centralized fashion. Each
vehicle needs to be charged to the upper limit of the state of charge (SOC) before
the next departure time. This process is not easy to achieve because charging
an electric vehicle battery takes larger time than filling a vehicle gas tank, which
can be accomplished in a few minutes. Charging a battery usually requires from
one to several hours, depending on the current SOC, the number of the available
charging inlets at the station, and the line capacity.
Sortomme et al [14] , [32]. proposed the problem of controlling the V2G assets
to provide regulation and ancillary services form the aggregator point of view.
The objective was to maximize the aggregator’s profit who providing ancillary
services to the market by controlling the charging rate of the EVs. Basically, the
aggregator schedule the EVs to a certain point preferred operating point (POP)
and the increase or reduction from this schedule facilitate the aggregator to provide
services for the grid.
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2.3 Wind Balancing and Demand-side Manage-
ment
Balancing the generation-load profile in the smart grid is an essential requirement.
However, this is not an easy task with integrating RES specially the wind power
due to its variability and stochastic nature [33]. Recently, researchers have tackled
this problem by considering flattening the generation-load curve by balancing the
wind generation. Usually, this was done using conventional (thermal) generators.
Al-Awami et al. [34] used a mixed-integer stochastic linear program (MILP) model
to optimize the coordinated trading of thermal and wind generation. The objec-
tive was to maximize the expected profit of the generation companies by obtaining
the optimal bidding strategy in the electricity markets under wind uncertainty.
The uncertainty of the wind was controlled using the conditional value at risk to
maximize the worst case scenario or the scenario with the least profits. the sim-
ulation results show that the coordination between the thermal generators and
wind can increase the expected profits even under the considered risk of several
uncertainties.
Asensio et al. [35] proposed a model for the day-ahead market trading of the
wind power producer and the demand response aggregator. the authors aimed to
maximize the expected profit of the wind power producer using a scenario-based
optimization model to deal with the uncertainties of the available wind power and
the market prices. the conditional value at risk was used to represent the level of
the uncertainty for the decision maker. the risk of the uncertainties was reduced
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and the expected profit was increased as shown by the simulation results.
Qiu et al. [36] used energy storage system (ESS) and a strategy for sharing the
risk by the concept of insurance to reduce the imbalance cost of the wind genera-
tion. However, this solution is not favourable due to the high cost of implementing
the ESS.
2.3.1 Electric Vehicles as Source of Wind Balancing
Recently, EVs have received massive interest from the general public because of
its significant role to reduce the environmental impacts of using fossil fuel and to
achieve energy independence. EVs have many benefits compared to the conven-
tional combustion engine vehicles such as fast response and lower operating costs.
Integrating EVs into the power grid with RES to mitigate their intermittent is the
main purpose behind V2G. Exploiting the EVs in balancing the wind generation
by controlling the charging and discharging operations has been addressed in some
research papers.
Yifan et al. [37] used a multi-stage stochastic model to integrate the EVs with
RES i.e., wind power as a source for balancing and an efficient way for mitigating
the risks. The optimal power flow in tow different cases was studied. the first
case without using the EV fleet, and the second case with the EV fleet is involved.
The simulation results show the effectiveness of the EVs as an alternative for the
thermal generators in terms of reducing the system costs. However, optimizing
the V2G assets was not considered in this research.
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Vandael et al. [38] proposed a tree model of the system operator (SO), the EVs
aggregator, and the EVs owners where two strategies for the distributed charging
was introduced, EVs reactive and proactive strategy. The latter considers divid-
ing the imbalance costs equally over the time span, while the former can be used
when the imbalances can be postponed. However, the last strategy requires a
small prediction errors.
Mets et al. [39] used a centralized model where the aggregator of the EVs
has a full control over the charging/discharging process for comparison with the
decentralized model. The distributed problem was modelled using the dual de-
composition of the main optimization problem into a small sub-problems where
each EV solves its own problem to minimize the mismatch between the wind gen-
eration and the demand.
Pillai et al. [40] discussed the impact of using the EVs as a source of DSM
when the wind power is integrated into the gird with different levels. the results
show that approximately 10% of the total vehicle fleets running in Denmark may
be transformed to EVs to supply the balancing power requirements of integrating
50% wind power generation.
2.3.2 Wind Balancing and EV Charging Using Game The-
ory
To optimally schedule the EV charging process; a large scale optimization problem
may be present. As the number of vehicles is increased, the computation costs
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will expand disastrously. A centralized control may not be the proper method
with such computational requirements. For such situations, decentralized control
should be developed. Decentralized solutions, in contrast with centralized ones,
aims to divide a large problem into a number of simpler sub-problems where the
solution for each sub-problem can be found by different agents. Each agent is
responsible for computing his part of the problem [41], [42]. Communications
between different agents is allowed whenever needed to share information. One of
the most prominent decentralized method is game theory which has drawn signif-
icant attention in the last years [43].
By nature, the charging scheduling of the EVs can be easily formulated as a game.
However, only a few papers have addressed the problem of balancing the wind gen-
eration by exploiting EVs from the perspective of the game theory.
Wu et al. [44] studied the demand side management jointly with the wind
generation balancing problem. Reducing the imbalance costs of the grid caused
by the fluctuation in wind generation was done by the demand-side resources such
as EVs, energy storage systems (ESS),..etc. The game model was proposed such
that the payoff of the players was a function of the energy price, which in turn
was a function of the imbalance.
Wu et al. [45] aimed to balance the wind power using EVs. A Stackelberg
game was modelled between the wind generation companies and the EVs. Usu-
ally, compensating for reactive wind power was done using static var compen-
sator’s (SVCs), since the response time of SVCs is considerably slow, using static
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synchronous compensator’s (STATCOMs) is the alternative solution. However,
STATCOMs are expensive which indicates that it’s not the feasible solution for
large systems implementation. Exploiting the EVs to compensate for the reactive
wind power was studied.
The payoff of the EVs in the work presented in [44] was a function of the energy
price which in turn is a function in the imbalance between the generation and the
load. However, its positively biased by the constant base price. In the first part
of this work, we formulated the payoff of the EVs as a function of the deduction
which in turn is a function of the imbalance. The positive biasing reflects that the
value of the objective function at the optimal power draw is always greater than
the value of objective function that proposed in our work. Hence, The proposed
model guarantees more benefit for the VPPO (i.e., less imbalance) while keeps
the payoff of the EVs maximized. Moreover, in [44] the operation constraints
of the grid was not completely considered, i.e., the departure and arrival time.
Also, in [39] the author did not count the overcharging constraint. Decomposing
the centralized problem using dual decomposition in [39] does not guarantee the
satisfaction of each EV owner since the decision will not be taken based on the
best response of the other EV owners. In other words, an equilibrium might not
be reachable.
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2.4 Wind Power Trading in Electricity Markets
The optimal trading strategies for the wind power producer (WPP) in the Elec-
tricity markets are modelled in tow types. The first type based on the assumption
that the WPP acts as a price taker, in this model the WPP behaviour would
not affect the market price. The second type based on the assumption that the
WPP acts as a price maker where the WPP behaviour will affect the market price
and consequently the market equilibrium. However, the decision making process
in both modes is based on the stochastic nature of the wind generation, hence
the deterministic models for wind generation are not applied. Furthermore, the
stochastic model was proven to outperform the deterministic models which built
on the forecasting values only in terms of the expected profit and the variability
of the profit [46].
Asensio et al. [35] studied the optimal bidding strategy of the wind power pro-
ducer into the day-ahead market was paired with the demand response. Stochastic
optimization model was used to handle the uncertainty in the wind output and
the energy prices. The results show that pairing the aggregation of the demand
response with the wind even under uncertainty will be beneficial for the wind
power producer as the end-user.
Bourry et al. [47] estimated a probability distribution for the imbalance cost
of wind power. A risk-based decision approach is used to determine the optimal
bidding strategies. The risk is quantified using the value-at-risk (VaR) model.
Dent et al. [48] discussed the bidding strategy of wind power producers with
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the assumption of continuous probability distribution for wind power. The corre-
lation between real-time price and wind power is also considered in the model.
2.4.1 Wind Power Trading Using Stochastic Optimization
In the last decade, the stochastic optimization raised as the proper modelling
tool for wind power trading into the electricity market. In the energy markets
framework the decision makers have to make their decisions over a time horizon
involves several stages. As example, at the first stage i.e., the day-ahead market,
the decisions are made before the realization of the energy prices of the real-time
markets. At the second stage, the real-time market decisions are made after the
clearing of the day-ahead and before the realization of the real-time market prices.
Hence, the stochastic programming is the proper tool for modelling the trading
of the wind power in energy markets.
The concept of the stochastic optimization based on the fact that the stochastic
process can be represented using a random variables. For the case of the con-
tinuous random variables, the solution is feasible over small set of scenarios, the
scenarios are built using scenario tree Fig. 2.1.
To capture the exact stochastic nature of the random variable, a large number
of scenarios must be generated. Due to the computational burden of the large
set, a reduced set need to be generated [49], [50], [51], [52]. Usually, the seasonal
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) is used to generate the sce-
nario tree for the uncertain parameters. Then, a fast-forward scenario reduction
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Figure 2.1: Schematic for scenario tree.
algorithm is used to reduce the generated tree [53].
Al-Awami et al. [34] the coordinated trading of thermal generators and wind
generators was proposed. They aim to maximize the gained profit form both
wind power and thermal power using two stage stochastic programming. The un-
certainties of the wind output, energy prices and imbalance prices was modelled
using scenarios. the risk of the wind output was mitigated by the coordination
with thermal generators.
Morales et al. [46] proposed a model for the wind power trading in day-ahead
and real-time markets using linear stochastic programming.
Catalao et al. [54] proposed the optimal bidding of a wind power producer in
the day-ahead and real-time markets using two-stages stochastic programming.
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CVaR was used as a risk measure for the uncertainties.
2.4.2 Wind Power Trading Using Robust Optimization
The main advantage behind robust optimization is that it offers an optimization
approach which does not require a prior knowledge a bout the probability distri-
bution to deal with uncertainty. Instead, dealing with the uncertain parameters
is done through the use of an uncertainty set [55]. on the contrary of stochastic
programming, which is consider a probabilistic-based optimization approach. In
this regard, for many problems in power systems its not an easy task to accu-
rately estimate the probability distribution of the uncertain variable. Moreover,
the problem size is hugely increased due to the need of a large number of scenarios
to be considered in order to guarantee the solution. Robust optimization solves
for the worst case of uncertainty within the uncertainty set, hence the solution is
feasible for all realizations of uncertain variables within the given uncertainty set.
The other advantage is that for many classes of optimization problems the RO
formulation is tractable [56].
Robust optimization was extensively discussed in models such as unit commit-
ments (UC) and security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) models when the
decision maker faced by uncertainty in energy prices or/and output of another
intermittent generator such as wind.
Zeng et al. [57] the UC problem was formulated as a two stage model, at the
first stage the scheduling of the thermal generators was decided, while at the sec-
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ond stage the economic dispatch of the units and the actual output of the power
was decided. The objective function was to minimize the total cost of the system
i.e., start-up, in the two stage. Two formulation of the UC problem was proposed
the risk constrained and the expanded robust. The work concluded by the results
that prove the economic benefits of the robust solution of the UC problem over
the opposed scenario based solution.
Zhao et al. [58] the UC problem was coupled with the wind uncertainty and
demand response in a two stage problem. Minimizing the total operation cost
of the power system was aimed by the authors. The results show that there a
significant reduction in the system cost using the proposed robust UC model.
Wang et al. [59] The concept of the adjustable uncertainty set was newly
introduced. The problem of the robust risk-constrained UC was formulated as
two level problem, the decomposition method was used to solve the optimization
problem when the the sub-problem was solved for certain values for the decision
variables of the master problem. Then, the relaxed master problem is solved based
on the convergence of the sub-problem. The objective is to minimize the total
operation cost of the system. Although the results show that the model is effec-
tive in reducing the cost, the proposed model is hardly applicable in the current
energy market structure.
Coordination of the wind power with another sources of power to mitigate the
risks and to handle the uncertainty under the robust optimization umbrella was
also proposed in the literature.
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Thatte et al. [60] used the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a risk measure
linked with the uncertainty set of the robust model to optimally bid the wind
power coordinated with storage system. Maximizing the profit of the wind power
producer was aimed under the uncertainty of the wind and the energy prices.
Lima et al. [61] and Jiang et al. [62] proposed the coordination with hydro
power generators. In [61] a two stage robust model was formulated. Maximization
the profit of the virtual power plant operator gained from the forward contracts
and the day-ahead market was proposed. Bender’s decomposition was used to
facilitate the solution of the min-max problem which reformulated as MILP prob-
lem. The results show that the proposed robust model was effective to mitigate
the risks of the wind output and the prices and to maximize the profit.
Although the effectiveness of the thermal generators as a source of wind power
balancing, the need for a more flexible source which matches with both positive
and negative imbalances with no extra cost is raised. Exploiting the V2G services
through the EVs considers the most suitable solution for such a case [15].
Melo et al. [63] propose a robust model for aggregating the EVs under the
uncertainty of the arrival and departure time coupled with the energy prices’ un-
certainty. The robust optimization approach for optimal scheduling of the VPP
and the optimal bidding strategy under the energy price’s uncertainty was pro-
posed in [64] and [65] respectively.
Al-Awami et al. [15] proposed a model for a load service entity (LSE) with
wind and thermal generators. The coordination between the wind-thermal gen-
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erators and the EVs was proposed as a source of risk mitigation and controlling
the uncertainness resulted from wind output and energy prices. The problem was
formulated as a stochastic mixed-integer linear program. The objective was to
maximize the aggregators profit. A case study for the Spanish driving behavior
was conducted. The results show the high impact of the EVs in maximizing the
profits. Furthermore, the environmental effect of integrating the EVs was clearly
evident.
According to the previous discussion, few papers discussed the coordination be-
tween wind-thermal generators and EVs using the robust approach for dealing
with uncertainties, which motivates us to provide the contribution of this work.
2.5 Summary
This chapter gives a brief literature review of different methods and models which
have been used for combined integration of the wind power and the electric vehicles
into the smart grids. It started with the researches which discussed the problem
of balancing the wind generation with the load. Balancing the wind generation by
using different technologies such as ESS and thermal generators were discussed.
Then we continued with the models which used the EVs as a balancing source from
various perspectives, game theoretic models had the special attention. Trading
the wind power in the electricity markets under the uncertainty of generation and
energy price was reviewed. The stochastic programming was the most used tool
to model the uncertainties. However, using the robust optimization to model the
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In this chapter, a novel model for solving the EVs charging scheduling problem
to balance the generation with demand in a distributed fashion was proposed.
Decentralized methods offer an alternative way to solve the scheduling problem
by reformulating the problem into smaller subproblems. However,the convergence
of the decentralized methods to a unique solution must be guaranteed. Exploiting
the charging process to provide other services to the grid is a benefit. In this
chapter, game theoretic approach is applied to balance the generation/demand of
a virtual power plant with intermittent power unit i.e., wind power. Scheduling
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the charging of the EVs is formulated as a game, where each EV owner acts
as a player. The equilibrium which ensure the convergence of the solution is
proved. Furthermore, a closed form solution for the NE of the game is analytically
obtained. Simulations of a case study are carried out to verify the proposed model
and its closed form solution. The simulation results show that the proposed
framework is effective in balancing the wind generation with the connected load
and benefits both the virtual power plant operator and the EVs owners.
3.1 Introduction
A major focus toward utilizing the green energy resources is being promoted glob-
ally. Wind energy is a very vital resource in this regard. Integration of the wind
energy in the power grid has been dramatically increased in the last few years.
Despite its major benefits, it has high uncertainty and variability. Therefore, the
optimal operation of the power grid and balancing the generation-load profile un-
der these conditions is a huge challenge [33], [60], [66]. EVs have been proven to
be one of the promised sources for helping the wind power generation companies
to face these challenges. Controlling the EVs charging can be used to provide the
required balance for the power grid [15].
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3.2 Problem Formulation & System Model
We assume that there is a virtual power plant (VPP) that consists of wind gen-
eration units, a parking lot for EVs, and some uncontrollable load. The main
responsibility of the virtual power plant operator (VPPO) is to ensure that the
energy consumption by the loads is matching with the wind generation. Other-
wise, the VPPO is required to pay imbalance costs. Hence, the main objective
of the VPPO is to maintain the imbalance as minimum as possible. VPPO ex-
ploits the connected EVs as a controllable load to reduce the imbalance taking
into account EVs considerations such as arrival time, departure time, and the ini-
tial state of charge. Unidirectional mode of charging was considered here, where
the discharging (bidirectional mode) is not practically applicable; e.g., it requires
advanced hardware implementation or other operational constraints.
Centralized control is not applicable for large number of EVs. Moreover, it gives
rise to privacy issues such as sharing arrival and departure times,...etc. Hence, we
propose a distributed charging algorithm where each EV decides about the total
power draw it consumes from the power grid. The operation constraints for each
EV will be respected, and the privacy will be maintained secure.
3.3 Game Theoretic Model
Considering the VPP shown in Fig. 3.1, where a set of NC EVs, Wind units with
power Wt generated at time t, and uncontrollable load of power Lt at time t, are







Figure 3.1: Schematic of a virtual power plant.
some constraints which result from either operational or personal requirements.
One of the constraints which reflects an individual requirement of the EV owner is
that the battery should be charged to a certain percentage before departure in the
morning (e.g., 60% of the maximum capacity). On the other hand, the maximum
power that can be delivered by the station charger reflects an operational limit
for the power drawn by EV c at any time t.
The key idea behind the distributed algorithm is that the mismatch between the
generation and the load will be aligned with the EVs behavior through offering
the proper incentives. An incentive offered by the VPPO to the participated EVs
in the balancing operation can be a deduction from the original offered energy
price. Therefore, the payoff of each EV is proportional to the total power drawn
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by the EV. Define:
λt = β∆t, (3.1)
as the price deduction per Kilowatt (KW), where




defines the mismatch between the generation (Wt) and the load (Lt+
∑NC
c=1 PDc,t)
at time slot t. We define PDc,t as the power draw of EV c at time slot t, and β
is a positive design parameter in (cent/KW 2) which is chosen by the VPPO to
align the mismatch with the offered deduction.
Since the EVs owners are independent decision makers, some EVs might want to
provide balancing services to the grid, while some other EVs might not have the
intention to provide any services. This conflict may result in formulating a game
between the EVs. The wind balancing game (WBG) is initiated between the EVs
to maximize their shared payoff by maximizing the offered incentive (discount) by
the VPPO.
3.3.1 EVs Game
The game among the EVs (WBG) can be constructed as:
 Players : the set NC of all the EVs.
 Strategies : based on the incentive given by the VPPO, the cth EV decides
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about its PDc, given the information of MCc as the maximum charging
capacity for each EV c , MPc,t as the maximum power drawn by the charging
station outlet for each EV c at each time t, and SOCIc as the initial state
of charge for each EV c.
 Payoff : the payoff function of each EV is defined in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.2 EVs pay-off
The payoff function for each EV can be formulated as the total deduction that
the EV gains. That is, for EV i ∈ NC , the payoff function at a certain time slot
is:




















PDc,t − βPD2c,t , (3.3)
where PD−c,t is the set of power draws of all EVs other than the c
th EV, at
time t. Therefore, the payoff of each EV is a function of all other EV responses
which leads to the proposed game.
3.3.3 Best Response and Nash Equilibrium
The NE of the WBG will be obtained using the best response strategy, which
is defined as the power draw of each EV that maximizes its own payoff function
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assuming that all other EVs power draw amounts are fixed. For each EV c ∈ NC ,
the best response is:







































≤ PDc,t , ∀ c, t ∈ {Ts, ..., Td,c − 1} (3.6)
PDc,t ≤MCc − SOCIc −
T−1∑
s=1
PDc,s ∀ c, (3.7)
0 ≤ PDc,t ≤MPc,t × Avc,t ∀ c, t , (3.8)
where Avc,t is the availability of EV c at time t for charging, Td,c is the departure
time of each EV c, and Ts is the time which the simulation is considered to be
started.
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Constraint (3.6) guarantees that the each EV will be charged to a certain level (in
this paper we consider it to be 60% of the full capacity) before the departure time
in the morning. Constraint (3.6) is designed to divide the charging percentage
equally. To prevent any degradation for the EV battery caused by over charging,
EV owners limit the amount of the charged energy by (3.7). Constraint (3.8)
limits the power draw by each EV to the maximum allowable power draw from
the station charger (i.e., MP) whenever the EV is available. The lower bound
is zero here to demonstrate the unidirectional charging mode. These constraints
define a feasible set for the charging schedule. This feasible set is denoted by φc
for EV c ∈ NC . Then, we define Nash Equilibrium as the vector of all players’





−c,t) ≥ fc(PDc,t, PD∗−c,t) ∀c ∈ NC ,∀ PDc ∈ φc





c,t) for all c ∈ NC , which provides a stable solution
of the game.
Thoerem: The Nash equilibrium for the WBG always exists and it’s unique.
proof: The proof is given in the appendix.
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3.3.4 Iterated Best Response (IBR) Algorithm
We assume that the distributed algorithm is running by the EVs at each time slot
t such that:
 Initialization phase
- The VPPO predicts the wind generation and the load forecasts for
each time slot t.
- The VPPO announces the energy price and the deduction for each
time slot t which satisfies its requirements by matching the generation with
the load.
 Execution phase
- At the beginning of each t each EV owner computes its power draw
according to the announced deduction, and submit it back to the VPPO,
considering the best responses of other EVs.
- The VPPO collects the submitted power amounts and computes the
generation/load mismatch, if it was below a certain predefined level, or a
maximum number of iterations is reached, the algorithm terminates and the
power amounts are final.
- Otherwise, the VPPO updates the deduction and the algorithm is
repeated.
39
3.3.5 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) Optimality Conditions
The Lagrangian function and KKT conditions for the EVs payoff maximization
























− α3c,tPD∗c,t + α4c,t(PD∗c,t −MPc,t) , (3.9)
where αkc,t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with each constraint. The KKT













+ α1c,t − α2c,t − α3c,t + α4c,t = 0, ∀c ∈ NC , t. (3.10)
− PD∗c,t ≤ 0, PD∗c,t −MPc,t ≤ 0 ∀c, t,







) ∀ c, t ∈ {Ts, ..., Td,c}. (3.11)
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α1c,t ≥ 0, α2c,t ≥ 0, α3c,t ≥ 0 α4c,t ≥ 0 ∀c, t. (3.12)
α3c,tPD
∗
c,t = 0, α4c,t(PD
∗
c,t −MPc,t) = 0 ∀c ∈ NC , (3.13a)
α1c,t(PD
∗
i , t−MCc + SOCIc +
T−1∑
s=1




− PD∗c,t) = 0. (3.13c)
Now, we are going to examine the different possible cases for the optimal power
draw using KKT optimality conditions.
1. α1c,t = α2c,t = α3c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.9) it can be seen that:
PD∗c,t =
(








2. α1c,t = α2c,t = α3c,t = 0, α4c,t > 0,
from (3.13a), when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MPc ,





3. α1c,t = α2c,t = α4c,t = 0, α3c,t > 0,
from (3.13a), when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗





4. α1c,t = α2c,t = 0, α3c,t , α4c,t > 0,
from (3.13a), when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗




5. α1c,t = 0, α2c,t , α3c,t , α4c,t > 0,
from (3.13a), when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗




6. α1c,t = α3c,t = α4c,t = 0, α2c,t > 0,






7. α1c,t = α3c,t = 0, α2c,t , α4c,t > 0,
from (3.13a, 3.13c), when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗





8. α1c,t = α4c,t = 0, α2c,t , α3c,t > 0,
from (3.13a, 3.13c), when α3c,t > 0, then PD
∗





9. α1c,t > 0, α2c,t = α3c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.13b), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗






10. α1c,t , α4c,t > 0, α2c,t = α3c,t = 0,
from (3.13a, 3.13b), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MCc − SOCIc −∑T−1
s=1 PD
∗
c,s, when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MPc.
11. α1c,t , α3c,t > 0, α2c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.13a, 3.13b), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MCc − SOCIc −∑T−1
s=1 PD
∗
c,s, when α3c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = 0.
12. α1c,t , α4c,t , α3c,t > 0, α2c,t = 0,
from (3.13a, 3.13b), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MCc − SOCIc −∑T−1
s=1 PD
∗
c,s, when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MPc , when α3c,t > 0, then
PD∗c,t = 0, contradiction, infeasible solution because PD
∗
c,t = MPc = 0 can
not occur.
13. α1c,t , α2c,t > 0, α3c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.13b, 3.13c), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MCc − SOCIc −∑T−1
s=1 PD
∗






14. α1c,t , α2c,t , α4c,t > 0, α3c,t = 0,
from (3.13b, 3.13c, 3.13a), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗










, when α4c,t > 0,
then PD∗c,t = MPc.
15. α1c,t , α2c,t , α3c,t > 0, α4c,t = 0,
from (3.13b, 3.13c, 3.13a), when α1i,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MCc − SOCIc −∑T−1
s=1 PD
∗





, when α3c,t > 0,
then PD∗c,t = 0.
16. α1c,t , α2c,t , α3c,t , α4c,t > 0,
from (3.13b, 3.13c, 3.13a), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MCc − SOCIc −∑Td,c−1
s=Ta,c





, when α4c,t > 0,
then PD∗c,t = MPc , when α3c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = 0, contradiction,
infeasible solution.
We can summarize the whole previous possible cases for the solution in the next
five cases:
1. α1c,t = α2c,t = α3c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.9) it can be seen that:
PD∗c,t =
(








2. α4c,t > 0, α1c,t = α2c,t = α3c,t = 0,
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from (3.13a), when α4c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = MPc,t , from (3.10)





3. α3c,t > 0, α1c,t = α2c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.13a), when α3c,t > 0, then PD
∗
c,t = 0, from (3.10)





4. α1c,t > 0, α2c,t = α3c,t = α4c,t = 0,
from (3.13b), when α1c,t > 0, then PD
∗





5. α2c,t > 0, α1c,t = α3c,t = α4c,t = 0,






Its clear that when more than one Lagrangian multiplier is larger than zero either
we have a contradiction or an equality. As an example for the contradiction
when α3c,t , α4c,t > 0 this indicates that PD
∗
c,t equal to 0 and MPc,t at the same
time. While α3c,t , α1c,t > 0 is an example for the equality case (i.e., PD
∗
c,t =





From the above, the optimum power draw for each EV c at each time t can
be given as in (3.16) and (3.17). The NE can be reached by applying the optimal
solutions in (3.16) and (3.17) iteratively.


























, for 0 < this value < MPc,t
MPc,t, for MPc,t ≤ This value < MCc − SOCIc −
∑T−1
s=1 PDc,s
MCc − SOCIc −
∑T−1
s=1 PDc,s, for MCc − SOCIc −
∑T−1
s=1 PDc,s ≤ This value < MPc,t
min(MPc,t,MCc − SOCIc −
∑T−1






To assess the efficacy of our proposed model, we assume that the VPP contains
one wind generation unit with installed capacity of 1 MW, with the ramping rate
of the wind power is modeled as normal distribution with zero mean and standard
deviation of 25 KW [15]. We consider a total number of 100 EVs, 16% are BMW-
i3, 16% are Nissan-Leaf, 24% as Fiat-500e, and 44% are Mitsubishi. This choice
is according to the best selling EVs in USA at 2015 [67, 68]. The specification of
each type of the EVs is given in [69, 70, 71, 72]. The initial state of charge for
each EV is randomly selected in the range of (0.1MC : 0.3MC), and β = 1.
The proposed distributed algorithm was compared to the centralized solution
when all the data (i.e., arrival time, departure time, initial state of charge,..,etc)










subject to (3.6) - (3.8).
The quadratic objective function models the imbalance cost for the VPPO.
Clearly, the convexity of the objective function indicates that the problem can
be solved in a centralized approach efficiently.
We consider the scenario of Saudi Arabian driving profile where most of the EV
owners leave to work at 8 A.M. (i.e., Td) and back home at 4 P.M. (i.e., Ta). We
assume that the EVs are plugged into the charger only at home, and that not
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all the EVs will depart nor come back at the same time. Simulation results for
one day with one hour as a time slot when 65% of the EVs depart at Td and 35%
remain at home are shown in Fig. 3.2. It can be seen that the behavior of the EVs
with a suitable incentive is accurately following the imbalance between the wind
generation and the load. However at the beginning of the charging period some
of the EVs may not exactly follow the generation/load minimization signal forced
by reaching a certain level of charging before the departure time (i.e., 0.6MC).
Comparison between the closed form solution of the NE and the simulated one
is also shown in Fig. 3.2, where the provided closed form solution of the game is
validated.
In Fig. 3.3, we consider the case when 25% of the EV owners remain at home
between Td and Ta or they choose to depart at other times for different reasons
(e.g., shopping, visit,...,etc). Clearly reducing the available number of the EVs
between 8 A.M. and 4 P.M. will decrease the chance to satisfy the minimization
signal. It’s clear that fulfilling the objective (i.e., minimizing the mismatch be-
tween generation and load) through these hours is proportional to the number of
the available EVs for charging at that time.
Since the most important factor for the EV owner is getting the required level of
charging which doesn’t conflict with its participation in the balancing game, we
plot Fig. 3.4 to show that the final state of charge for a sample of 30 EV at the
end of the day is equivalent in both the distributed and the centralized solution.
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Figure 3.2: One day simulation for 100 EVs with 35% remaining EVs.
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Figure 3.3: One day simulation for 100 EVs with 25% remaining EVs.
50
EV index




























In this Chapter, the problem of balancing the wind generation with the load
in a small virtual power plant as a game theoretic model was addressed. The
VPPO coordinate a game between a number of EVs to fulfill the imbalances. An
incentive-based scheme to be offered to the EVs where each EV schedule its power
draw according to the offered incentive was developed. Furthermore, a closed form
solution for the NE of the game was obtained. The distributed model was shown
that it can achieve almost the same solution to the centralized one when the EVs
are controlled by the VPOO in terms of balancing the mismatch between wind
generation and load.
3.6 List of Publications
 Ahmed M. Abd El-Moaty, Wessam Mesbah and Ali T. Al-Awami,
”Incentive-Based Game Theoretic Approach for Wind Power Balancing Us-
ing Electric Vehicles, IEEE 9th Gulf Conference and Exhibition center. (9th








In this chapter, we propose a market framework for virtual power plant operator
(VPPO) who acts EVs aggregator and owns wind and thermal generators. The
aggregator aims to maximize his profit which gains from bidding energy amounts
in the day-ahead (DA) market. The optimal bidding strategy combined with
controlling the Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) assets under the uncertainty of the wind
output, energy prices, imbalance prices, and demand. On the contrary of the
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recent models, we model the uncertainties using the robust optimization (RO)
where the decision maker takes its decision under the worst case scenario of the
uncertain parameters. A case study and simulation was conducted to reflect the
effectiveness of the proposed model. The robust model was compared to the
deterministic model, the results show that the robust model under uncertainties
give profits which is relatively close to the deterministic model.
4.1 Introduction
At the last years, the focus of researchers was directed to use the stochastic
programming approach to handle the uncertainty in decision making process [49].
However, stochastic programming has been proved to be more computationally
challenging due to the need of the large number of scenarios which is indispensable
to capture the real nature of the random variable. Furthermore, the complete
knowledge of the probability distribution of the random variable is necessary
which sometimes not available [73]. Recently. another alternative for the stochas-
tic programming has been attracted the attention of the researchers that is robust
optimization. Although robust optimization field is consider relatively young
research area. There have been many publications which reflects the advantages
of the RO in many of research areas such as finance, energy, supply chain
management, circuit design and scheduling problems. The basic concept behind
the robust optimization is that it is not a probabilistic model, the uncertainty is
handled based on a construction of an uncertainty set where the solution is robust
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for all the realization of the uncertain parameter within the defined set [74, 75, 56].
4.2 System Model
We assume a small Virtual Power Plant (VPP) with wind generation output Wd,t
from unit d at time t, thermal units with output Pg,t form unit g at time t, a load
consisting of two types controllable load such as EVs and uncontrollable load, as
shown in Fig. 4.1.






Figure 4.1: schematic of a virtual power plant.
to the day-ahead market 24 hour before the time market clearing process. The
VPPO faces uncertainties of the actual wind power, the energy and imbalance
prices, and the loads. The coordination between the EVs and thermal generators
to balance the wind deviation is presented in Section 4.3.
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4.3 Problem Formulation
The profit of the VPPO from participating in the day-ahead market when facing
















































c,t , PDc,t, δg,e,t
}
. and ˜(..) defines the
uncertainty in the input parameter.
The first line of (4.1) defines the profit from thermal generation expressed as the
income from the amount bid of power in the day-ahead market minus the cost of
production and the thermal generation start-up costs. The second line represents
the profit from bidding the wind power into the market and the profit gained from
positive imbalances minus the penalties the VPPO might faces as a result of the
negative imbalances. The last line defines in its first term the revenue from the
loads. Noting that γ which is less than one represents an incentive for the EVs to
participate in the coordination, and R is the utility rate which reflects the energy
price plus a fixed amount as a revenue for the VPPO. While, the second term is
the cost of purchasing the scheduled energy from the market.
The imbalance up term defines the running long status of the producer, where
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the imbalance down term defines the running short status, at least one of them is
zero at any time period t. The producer is running long when the generation is
larger than the load or [15]:
Imbupt =


































The producer is running long when the actual generation > the scheduled gener-
ation, also he is running long when the scheduled load > the actual load, in this
case ∆Pt is negative and equal to the imbalance up. The same concept can be


















APminc,t − Lt (4.6)









PDc,t − L̃RTt (4.7)
When the producer is running short or facing imbalance down, the upper
bound of the imbalance is the scheduled amounts of generation minus the
scheduled load. Its valid to assume safe upper bound by considering the
maximum output of the generation. When the producer is running long,
the imbalance up is upper bounded by the actual generation minus the
actual load.
 Operating limits
0 ≤ W bidd,t ≤ Wmaxd (4.8)
Ig,t.P
min




g ≤ P bidg,t ≤ Pmaxg .Ig,t (4.10)
 Ramping up/down limits
−RDg ≤ PRTg,t − PRTg,t−1 ≤ RUg (4.11)
 Minimum up/down times
InitUpg∑
t=1
(1− Ig,t) = 0 , (4.12)
t+MinUpg−1∑
n=t
Ig,n ≥MinUpg.(Ig,t − Ig,t−1) ,
∀g,∀t = InitUpg + 1....NT −MinUpg + 1 (4.13)
NT∑
n=t
Ig,n − (Ig,t − Ig,t−1) ≥ 0 ,
∀g,∀t = NT −MinUpg + 2....NT (4.14)
The first constraint of the minimum up times constraints used to define the
initial-up time which is the number of the initial periods in which the gen-
erator must be on. The second constraint define the the minimum-up time
during which is the number of the time periods which the generator must
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be on before it turns off again. The last constraint applies the minimum-up
time constraint for the period of the final minUp− 1 times such that, if the
generator g is on, it should continue on until the end of the time horizon.
Another three equivalent constraints to (4.12) - (4.14) can be included to
model the minimum down times.
 Production cost constraints
Cg(P
RT














0 ≤ δg,e,t ≤ BrkPtg,e −BrkPtg,e−1 ∀g, e, t (4.17)





Usually the production cost is defined as quadratic function of the power
produced from generator g at time t. To avoid the quadratic function, a
piecewise linear approximation is used such that, the exponential curve of
the cost is discretized into segments, each segment with a defined slope.
Then, the cost is approximated as a function of these segments and slopes
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a given in Eq. (4.15).
 EV charging power limits
0 ≤ POPc,t ≤MPc,t (4.19)
 EV charge requirement limits
T Dep(1)∑
t=1
PDc,t ≥ 0.9MCc − SOCIc (4.20a)
T Dep(1)∑
t=1
PDc,t ≤MCc − SOCIc (4.20b)
T Dep(x)c∑
t=1
PDc,t − (x− 1)SOCreducc ≤MCc − SOCIc (4.20c)
NT∑
t=1
PDc,t − 4× SOCreducc ≤MCc − SOCIc (4.20d)
NT∑
t=1
PDc,t − 4× SOCreducc ≥ 0 (4.20e)
 EV Additional power limits
0 ≤ APmaxc,t ≤MPc,t × Avc,t − POPc,t
∀c ∈ NC , t ∈ NT (4.21)
0 ≤ APminc,t ≤ POPc,t ∀c ∈ NC , t ∈ NT (4.22)
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 EV Actual power draw limits
POPc,t − APminc,t ≤ PDc,t ≤ POPc,t + APmaxc,t
∀c ∈ NC , t ∈ NT (4.23)
4.3.1 Deterministic Model
In the deterministic model the VPPO take his decision with no consideration
for the uncertainty such that all the parameters assumed to be accurate. Under
the deterministic model the VPPO will not benefit form the imbalance income
or incurred any imbalance cost. Hence, the part of the imbalance profit in the
objective function will be removed as the constraints (4.2) - (4.7).
4.3.2 Robust Optimization Model
In the robust optimization literature, the uncertainty is handled by defining the
uncertain parameters over uncertainty sets which represent all the possible re-
alizations of the uncertain parameter. More details for the uncertainty set are
introduced in section (4.3.3).
4.3.3 Uncertainty Set
The selection of the uncertainty set is usually relies into the available information
about the uncertain parameter [74]. In this paper, we consider the case of the
taking decision process by the VPPO without waiting for the reutilization of the
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uncertain parameter. In other words, the problem is formulated for the worst-
case realization of the uncertainty. Hence, the uncertainty set is defined as Z =
ZW ∪ Zλ ∪ ZL where ZW is the set of the wind uncertainty and Zλ ,ZL is the set
of the energy price and the set of the demand respectively. The uncertainty set
of the wind power gives the relation between the nominal value of the generation
and the lower and upper bounds of the deviation as:
ZW =
{
Wt = Ŵt + γ
+
t W t − γ−t Wt,Wt ≥ 0, γ+t , γ−t ∈ {0, 1},∀t
}
(4.24)
where Ŵ is th nominal value for the wind generation, W,W is the lower and upper
bounds of the deviation respectively. Clearly, the γ+t , γ
−
t at least one of them is
equal to zero at each time period t since there is only a positive or a negative
deviation at a certain time period t. Similarly, the sets Zλ for the price and ZL
for the demand are:
Zλ =
{
λt = λ̂t + γ
+





Lt = L̂t + γ
+
t Lt − γ−t Lt, Lt ≥ 0, γ+t , γ−t ∈ {0, 1},∀t
}
(4.26)
It worth noting that the uncertainty in the imbalance prices considered as a func-
tion of the energy price with the parameters ro, ru where ru > 1 and ro < 1. For
more about the formulation of this variables, please refer to [46] and [34].
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4.3.4 Robust Counterpart
One known method of dealing with uncertainty in the objective function is to











ĉTx ≥ m ∀c ∈ C
Ax ≤ b ∀x ∈ X
where C is the uncertainty set for the parameter c, m is an auxiliary variable.
Hence, the uncertainty of the objective function was reformulated as a constraint-
wise uncertainty. Similarly, the uncertainty in the energy price in model (4.1) and
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(λ̂t − λt)W bidd,t + (λ̂t − λt)rot Imb
up
t − (λ̂t + λt)rut Imbdnt
+Rt
(













Since its not favorable for robust optimization to deal with equality constraints




























































Where K is a binary auxiliary variable to guarantee that only one of (4.28) and
(4.29) is active at each time. Furthermore, the constraint (4.7) can be transformed
into its robust counterpart as:









PDc,t − (L̂RTt + L
RT
t ) (4.30)
Such that we removed all the uncertainties and completed the formulation of the
robust counterpart of our model.
4.4 Case Study
A case study for a VPP that serves a small urban area was considered. We aim
from this study to assess the benefits of the proposed coordination for both the
VPPO and EVs’ owners under the considered uncertainties. VPP consists of one
wind power plant with installed capacity of 200 MW, five thermal generators with
total installed capacity of 340 MW. For detailed characteristics of the wind and
the thermal generators, we refer the reader to [15] and [34]. A group of 10000
EVs with 50 similar driving profile representing the Spanish commuting behavior
are used. The batteries capacities, EV’s characteristics are such that in [15]. A
set of 1000 scenario for the wind output, energy price, and the imbalance price,
are generated using seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average technique
(ARIMA) [34]. Three load profiles (low, nominal,and high) are used. Hence,
reducing the scenarios-tree from 1000 to 3 is used by the fast-forward method
66
[52]. The final size of the scenario-tree is 34 = 81 scenarios. The reduced scenario-
tree is used to construct the uncertainty sets for the wind output, energy price,
imbalance price, and demand as in Fig. 4.2 to Fig. 4.4.
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Figure 4.2: Wind nominal values and uncertainty bounds.
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Figure 4.3: Price nominal values and uncertainty bounds.
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Figure 4.4: Demand nominal values and uncertainty bounds.
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The uncertain parameter was considered in the uncertainty set as [nominal
value - lower bound, nominal value + upper bound], then the upper and lower
bounds modeled as a percentage of the nominal value to represent the uncertainty
set as (nominal value ×(1±θ) ), θ is chosen by the VPPO according to its behavior
as a risk-averse or risk-taker decision maker [60]. Clearly, the choice of θ decided
the size of the uncertainty set. Three different values for each uncertainty set are
considered θw, θλ, θL for wind output, energy price, and demand respectively.
For the uncoordinated case, we meant by this that the thermal-wind coordination
was considered, but the EVs are not treated as a source of balancing. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the the opportunistic charging is used to charge the EVs. In this
way the EVs are charged by the maximum charging rate once they are plugged
in between 10 A.M and 3 P.M, 6 P.M and 9 P.M. The decision variables of the
EVs (i.e., POP,APmax, ...etc) are set to zero, and the total amount needed for
the EVs charging is added as a constant load.
The solution algorithm was modeled using IBM ILOG CPLEX [77] and executed
on a PC with an Intel(R) core  i3 @ 2.53 GHz CPU and 6 GB of RAM, the
processing time is about 15 seconds.
4.5 Simulation Results
Two cases are considered to assess the effectiveness of the proposed model. In case
1, the robust optimization is used to model the uncertainties of the uncoordinated
case between the EVs and wind-thermal generators. In case 2, the coordination
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between the EVs and the thermal-wind generators was considered under both
deterministic and robust models. The profit of the VPPO at the deterministic
case was compared with both the coordinated and the uncoordinated profit of
the robust model under different levels of uncertainty. Table 4.1 shows the re-
sults of the VPPO’s profit for the worst case scenario of the realization of the
uncertain parameters when the uncertainty set at its extreme bound. However,
even the deterministic model outperforms the robust model in terms of profits
by (27972 − 22395)/27972 ' 19.4 %, the robust model counts for the worst case
realization of the uncertain parameters which keeps the decision maker safe with
any realization of the uncertainty. Moreover, moving from the most conservative
situation i.e., worst case might increase the profits of the VPPO with considering
the uncertainties. The benefits of the coordination is very evident on the profit of
the VPPO compared to the uncoordinated case. The coordination gain be given
as (22395− 21178)/22395 ' 5.43 %. The impact of considering the uncertainties
using the the robust optimization is very clear when it comes to the non-robust
profits. The realized profits was calculated based on the decisions of the aggre-
gator when the nominal values were considered in the scheduling day, while in
the actual day the aggregator might face different scenarios of uncertainties. The
negative realized profits confirms that considering the deterministic model might
misleading the decision maker to the case of unrealized profits. In other words,
the uncertainties should be included into the optimization. Moreover, the profits







Realized Profits with 5% 25251
Realized Profits with 10% 24541
Realized Profits with 15% 24601
Realized W. case Profits -1496
Table 4.1: VPPO’s profits with/without EVs coordination
Unit No. Time (0-24)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.2: Thermal units commitment with no coordination
Unit No. Time (0-24)
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4.3: Thermal units commitment with EVs coordination
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the commitment of the thermal generation units in
both coordinated and uncoordinated cases. Note that the status which changes
was highlighted by bold font.
Fig. 4.5 shows a comparison between the wind power bids in case of EVs coordi-
nation and the uncoordinated case. It is clear that the EV coordination helps the
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VPPO to bid the wind power more aggressively in the market, which reflects the
benefits of the coordination between wind-thermal generators and EVs.
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Hours



















Figure 4.5: Wind power bid offers of selected hours of the simulation day.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a model of a wind power producer who owns a thermal generation
units, and control a number of EVs as a controllable load was proposed. The wind
power producer is valid to be considered as an EVs aggregator who submit bids
in the day-ahead market. The optimal bidding strategy for the aggregator in the
day-ahead market was modeled for the worst case scenario using robust optimiza-
tion. The uncertainties about the wind output, energy price, imbalance price, and
demand was considered. The robust counterpart for the problem was obtained.
A case study to assess the validity of the proposed model was established. A
comparison between the profit of the wind producer in the case of coordination
with EVs and without coordination was conducted. The results show that the
profit of the wind power producer will be increased when coordination with the
EVs takes a place. Moreover, in case of coordination, the wind producer can bid
the wind more aggressively in the day-ahead market.
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In this chapter, the main contributions of this thesis was summarized. Then, a
suggestion for some possible future research directions was introduced.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
The main objective of this thesis was to study the impact of the combined inte-
gration of wind power and electric vehicles into smart grids. Two projects were
conducted to analyze this integration. The conclusion of the thesis can be sum-
marized as follows:
1) The electric vehicles can be considered the most prominent source for mit-
igating the risks of the wind power intermittent. First, EVs can be used
to balance the wind/load system by controlling the charging rate. In this
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regard, a game theoretic model for EVs to decide about their actual power
draw while maintaining the system balanced was proposed. The balance re-
quirement was aligned with the EVs payoffs by choosing a proper incentive
for the EVs to provide the balancing service. A closed form solution for the
equilibrium of the game was provided using the KKT optimality conditions,
after the proof of the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the
game. Simulation results were carried out to validate the effectiveness of the
proposed decentralized model and the closed form solution compared with
the centralized solution.
2) The uncertainty of the wind power is one of the main obstacles which faces
the power producer when he submit his bidding in the electricity market.
The coordination between the wind and the EVs will benefit both the EV
owners and the Wind producer. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, a model
of a wind power producer was proposed, which is valid to be considered
as an EVs aggregator, faced by several uncertainties. The optimal bidding
strategy for the aggregator in the day-ahead market was modeled for the
worst case scenario using robust optimization. The uncertainties about the
wind output, energy price, imbalance price, and demand were considered.
The robust counterpart for the problem was obtained. A case study to
assess the validity of the proposed model was established and a comparison
between the profit of the wind producer in the case of coordination with
EVs and without coordination was conducted. The results show that the
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profit of the wind power producer will increase when coordination with the
EVs takes a place. Moreover, in case of coordination, the wind producer
can bid the wind more aggressively in the day-ahead market.
We may conclude this thesis by these findings:
(a) The electric vehicles may be used as a balancing source for the wind-
load mismatch effectively.
(b) Proper incentives should be chosen carefully to encourage the EVs own-
ers for participation in V2G services.
(c) The EVs can help the wind power producer to mitigate the risks of
the wind output and the energy price, which enables the producer to
optimally bid its generation in different electricity markets.
5.2 Future Research
1) Both the wind power, and the electric vehicles have the capability to provide
ancillary services to the power grid, such as frequency regulation, and spin-
ning reserve. Participation in these markets could be economically beneficial
to wind power producers. Future research can be conducted to analyze the
trading behaviors of the wind power producers and models can be built to
obtain their optimal bidding strategies in these ancillary service markets.
2) Other models for competition in case of the wind-EVs coordination in the
electricity markets may be considered, such as game theory. The impact of
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the wind power producer as a price maker in the market may be included.
For future work, comparing the advantages and disadvantages of using dif-
ferent models may be studied.
3) Studying other renewable energy sources, such as solar, biomass and hydro-
thermal which constitute an important part of the future power system
structure. The models to obtain the bidding strategies of different types of
renewable energy in the electricity market can be built in future research
work. The models can be extended for those producers who have multiple
types of renewable energy.
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APPENDIX
Clearly, the payoff function of the ith EV is a concave function with respect to
PDi,t and the set of constraints is a convex set. Hence, the Nash equilibrium of
WBG directly follows the work presented in [78, Theorem 2]. Next, we prove the
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. From [78, Theorem 4], the sufficient condition for
NE uniqueness in a concave game is that the matrix G(x) + GT (x) is a negative



















Since the payoff defined in Eq.3.3, the derivatives w.r.t PDi,t can given as:
∂2f1
∂2PDi,t
= −2β ∀i ∈ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T (2)
∂2f1
∂PDi,t∂PDm,t
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For any arbitrary N × 1 non-zero vector r, we have rT (G(x) +GT (x))r , G(x) is
symmetric matrix, also (G(x) +GT (x)) is symmetric, and G(x) = GT (x)
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Then,
rT (G(x) +GT (x))r = −2βrTG(x)r (6)
= −2β (sum of squares)
< 0.
Then, rT (G(x) + GT (x))r is negative definite, which implies that the NE is
unique [78, Theorem 4]. NE is given numerically using [78, Theorem 10].
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